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The Financial Impact Of Prospective Payment On Hospitals
On October 1, 1983, Medicare began to phase out the traditional method of cost reimbursement of hospitals in favor of a prospective payment system based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). The prospective system phase-in will be completed by September 30, 1986, as prospective payment starts on the first day of the hospitals' fiscal year. The impact of Medicare prospective payment on hospitals has been a subject of debate for some time. The following is an attempt to provide some quantitative estimates of the financial consequences of the new system.
The estimates are based on data from 5,639 Medicare cost reports for fiscal periods ending in 1981. Selected items were extracted from the cost reports by the Health Care Financing Administration and used to calculate the current prospective prices.
The legislation implementing the prospective system requires that ultimately DRG rates of payment must be set relative to the national urban and rural average cost per Medicare case. However, during the first three transitional years of prospective payment, rates are based on a "blend" of each hospital's historical costs, regional average costs per case in each of the nine census divisions, and national averages. 1 The legislation also requires that in the first two transition years, prospective payment must be "budget neutral;" it must pay the same national aggregate amounts that would have been paid under the previous reimbursement system. To achieve this, the hospital-specific and regional components of firstyear reimbursement were reduced by "budget neutrality factors."
A valuable indication of the potential impact of the prospective system can be obtained by studying the distribution of the 1981 costs per Medicare discharge. Because the prospective system provides for different rates of payment for urban and rural hospitals, the urban and rural distributions were considered separately. To make them comparable, hospital costs were first "aligned" to the same fiscal period-calendar year 1981.
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Capital and direct education costs, which are not reimbursed prospectively, were removed. The remaining costs were standardized in order to remove differences attributable to case mix, labor costs, and indirect expenses associated with medical education programs. The alignment, removal, and standardization methodology was exactly the same as the one prescribed by the prospective system for the calculation of national and regional cost averages. The characteristics of the distributions are summarized in Exhibit 1. Both the urban and rural cost-per-discharge distributions are somewhat skewed in the same direction, with slightly more hospitals below the respective means than above them. The degree of dispersion around the means, although less than in a normal distribution with the same parameters, has significant implications, especially considering that costs were standardized to the full extent recognized by the prospective payment system. In 1981, 25 percent of all hospitals had standardized costs exceeding the respective national means by at least $325 (urban hospitals) and $275 (rural hospitals) per discharge. Another 25 percent had costs per discharge lower than the national-means by at least $386 (urban hospitals) and $310 (rural hospitals). This suggests that prospective payment based on DRG rates related to the national means may dramatically affect a large number of hospitals, some of which will receive considerably less reimbursement than in the past while others will be paid considerably more.
Exhibit
A more complete analysis of the potential impact of prospective payment was performed using a computer model of hospital costs and reimbursement. The 1981 actual cost data were used to project costs in the first year under the prospective system (fiscal periods beginning on or after October 1, 1983). The projections were made under the assumption that reimbursement reforms instituted by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1983 (TEFRA) and the subsequent change to a prospective system, made a considerable dent in the rate of Medicare hospital cost increases. Specifically, costs in the pre-TEFRA years were projected based on historical rates of increase (which considerably exceeded price inflation); costs in subsequent years were assumed to rise at 1 percent per year in excess of the price inflation measured by the hospital market basket. (The 1 percent figure corresponds to costs in excess of price inflation presumed to be related to the introduction of new medical technology. These costs are reimbursable under TEFRA and prospective payment in its current phase.) First-year reimbursement was calculated according to the methodology spelled out in the regulations implementing the prospective system.
2 Volume (Medicare discharges) and case-mix were assumed unchanged from their 1981 respective levels.
No attempts were made to project hospital costs past the first year of prospective reimbursement. Instead, first-year reimbursement was recalculated using the formulas that will apply in the next two transitional years and the first year of prospective payment based on national DRG rates. The recalculated reimbursements were again compared with the first-year projected costs. Discounting price and technology inflation, this approach is equivalent to assuming that hospital costs will be frozen through 1987 at their 1982 levels.
The estimates of the impact of the first four years of prospective payment are presented in Exhibit 2. The results indicate that more hospitals may experience shortfalls in the transitional phases of the prospective system than under the national rates scheduled to go into effect by the fourth year. But the magnitude of the shortfalls appears to increase dramatically as the transition toward national rates progresses. On the other hand, the proportion of hospitals that will become "winners" under the prospective system and the amount of "bonus" (payments in excess of costs) also increases as the hospitals' specific and regional components are phased out.
The projected national shortfall in the first year of prospective payment amounts to $1.2 billion affecting 57 percent of the hospitals; the projected average percentage of unreimbursed costs is 4.9. The remaining hospitals are projected to collect $0.4 billion in bonus payments representing, on the average, 6.9 percent of their costs. The pattern of relatively moderate shortfalls and bonuses is consistent with the predominance of the hospital-specific component in the first-year reimbursement formula. But that component was reduced because of the budget neutrality requirements which may explain the relatively large percentage of hospitals projected to experience shortfalls. By the fourth year, when full national rates will go into effect, the total shortfall is projected to increase to $3.3 billion but to be spread over fewer hospitals (47 percent). For the average "loser" hospital, this translates into 14.9 percent of unreimbursed costs. Bonus payments may increase to $2.5 billion, representing, on the average, 25.4 percent of the "winner" hospitals' costs. This drastic impact of national rates is to be expected given the distribution of costs relative to national means. It is worth noting that all four simulated formulas are budget neutral, as the national aggregate reimbursement is virtually the same. (The difference between the national shortfall and the national bonus is constant.) of performance and used as the dependent variable. (For hospitals receiving a bonus, this variable takes negative values.) Various hospital characteristics were used as independent variables, and stepwise regression was performed. The results are presented in Exhibit 3. The equation accounts for 53 percent of the variation in projected hospital performance under the prospective payment. Not unexpectedly, lengthy stays, high proportions of ancillary costs, high proportions of days in special care units, and low occupancy are associated with poor performance under prospective payment. To the extent that these factors can be controlled, the results highlight the road to survivability under prospective payment. But they also underscore the plight of hospitals for which above average length-ofstay, proportion of ancillary costs, and proportion of special care days may be due, at least in part, to the patients' severity of illness. Somewhat surprising is the strength of the dichotomous rural location variable, which is a predictor of poor performance when considered in conjunction with other variables. Other adverse factors are location in the West or North Central census regions, investor ownership, and large bed size. The ratio of interns and residents to beds, the case-mix index, and the proportion of Medicare days (of total patient days) have negative coefficients making them favorable predictors. This relationship is easily understood in the case of the intern-and resident-to-beds ratio. As mandated by Congress, this ratio is the basis of a relatively generous reimbursement adjustment for indirect medical education costs. The negative The model used to estimate the impact of prospective payment has obvious limitations. Not the least of these is the assumption that hospital costs will continue to grow under prospective payment at a rate equal to price and technology inflation. This assumption appears to be reasonably conservative for projecting costs during the first year of prospective reimbursement. 5 But as the transitional reimbursement formulas are gradually replaced with national DRG rates, with ensuing progressively larger losses for some hospitals, the institutions facing large deficits will be forced to make deeper cost cuts. On the other hand, hospitals receiving large bonuses may have less of an incentive to keep the inflationdiscounted costs frozen at the 1982 levels, as assumed in making the projections. These factors may result in smaller than projected shortfalls and bonuses in the second through fourth years of prospective payment. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of the estimated shortfalls, particularly under full national DRG rates, casts doubts on the ability of some institutions to adapt to the new reimbursement environment in the relatively short period of time at their disposal. At the other end of the spectrum, some hospitals may expect large increases in reimbursement in the next four years. 
